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Abstract-Mobile edge computing (MEC) has emerged for 
reducing energy consumption and latency by allowing mobile 
users to offload computationally intensive tasks to the MEC server. 
Due to the spectrum reuse in small cell network, the inter-cell 
interference has a great effect on MEC’s performances. In this 
paper, for reducing the energy consumption and latency of MEC, 
we propose a game theory based approach to join task offloading 
decision and resources allocation together in the MEC system. In 
this algorithm, the offloading decision, the CPU capacity 
adjustment, the transmission power control, and the network 
interference management of mobile users are regarded as a game. 
In this game, based on the best response strategy, each mobile user 
makes their own utility maximum rather than the utility of the 
whole system. We prove that this game is an exact potential game 
and the Nash equilibrium (NE) of this game exists. For reaching 
the NE, the best response approach is applied. We calculate the 
best response of these three variables. Moreover, we investigate 
the properties of this algorithm, including the convergence, the 
computational complexity, and the Price of anarchy (PoA). The 
theoretical analysis shows that the inter-cell interference affects on 
the performances of MEC greatly. The NE of this game is Pareto 
efficiency. Finally, we evaluate the performances of this algorithm 
by simulation. The simulation results illustrate that this algorithm 
is effective in improving the performances of the multi-user MEC 
system. 
Keywords-Mobile edge computing, task offloading, 
transmission power control, game theory, interference. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Motivation and Problem Statement 
The task offloading and the resources allocation are 
important to the performances of multi-user MEC [1-4]. First, 
an appropriate offloading decision and resources allocation 
strategy can improve the performances of multi-user MEC 
greatly, such as reducing energy consumption and execution 
latency. Second, since the network resources, such as energy, 
memory space, computing capacity, is limited in both MEC 
server and mobile devices, it is efficient to choose an 
appropriate task offloading decision and resource allocation 
strategy to make the system utility maximum. The task 
offloading means that the mobile users choose to offload 
computation task to MEC server or compute locally based on 
the energy consumption and execution latency of this task. The 
resources allocation means that the MEC server or the mobile 
user chooses appropriate network resources (such as 
transmission power, CPU capacity, communication channel, 
etc.) to reduce the energy consumption and execution latency 
of MEC [8-15]. Moreover, since the offloading decision and the 
resources allocation are related and can affect each other, the 
most effective approach is to optimize these two items jointly 
rather than separately. There are two different kinds of 
approaches to achieve the above goals: the traditional 
optimization approach (such as convex optimization [8-15]) 
and the game theory based approach [5-6]. Until now, the 
traditional optimization has been well studied. However, there 
are some limitations in this approach, such as the heavy burden 
of complex information exchange between MEC server and 
mobile users, high computational complexity, etc. Even the 
game theory based approach can overcome the disadvantages 
of the traditional optimization approach (which will be 
explained in detail in the rest of this paper), the research on 
game theory based approach is just starting. There are still 
many issues need to be investigated, such as power control, 
interference management, etc. 
Therefore, the fundamental problem will be investigated in 
this paper can be summarized as: how can we join the 
offloading decision and the resource allocation together based 
on game theory to improve the performances of MEC, i.e., 
reducing energy consumption and execution latency? This is 
challenging since the offloading decision and the resources 
allocation are related and can affect each other [24].  
B. Limitations of Prior Arts 
There are some limitations on both the traditional 
optimization approach and the game theory based approach [5-
6]. First, even the traditional optimization approach is effective 
in improving the performances of MEC, it has three 
nonnegligible disadvantages [5-6]: (1) because the optimization 
objective in traditional optimization approach is the utility of 
the whole system, so there have massive information collection 
from mobile devices and massive information exchange 
between mobile devices and MEC server; (2) since different 
mobile devices are usually owned by different individuals and 
they may pursue different interests, the traditional optimization 
approach has limited capability to reflect the interaction 
between mobile users; (3) the computational complexity of 
traditional optimization approach is high; on the one hand, the 
optimization objective is complex; on the other hand, since the 
optimization objective is complex, the calculation of optimal 
solutions is also complicated, such as decoupling, convex 
optimization, etc. Second, game theory based approaches are 
proposed in recent years. However, on the one hand, the 
research on game theory based approach is just starting; such as 
the algorithms proposed in [5] and [6]; on the other hand, at 
present, the game theory based approach only takes offloading 
decision and channel allocation into account. This is far from 
enough for the MEC system.   
C. Proposed Approach and Advantages over Prior Arts 
In this paper, we propose a game theory based approach to 
join task offloading decision and resources allocation together 
in the MEC system. In this algorithm, the offloading decision, 
the CPU capacity adjustment, the transmission power control, 
and the network interference management of mobile users are 
regarded as a game. In this game, based on the best response 
  
 
 
strategy, each mobile user makes their own utility maximum 
rather than the utility of the whole system. Based on this 
algorithm, the system can reach the state of equilibrium and the 
performance can be optimized.  
The proposed algorithm addresses the limitations of prior 
arts, which can be summarized as follows. Compared with the 
traditional optimization approaches, the proposed solution has 
the same capability on dealing with multi-parameters, i.e., joint 
optimizing offloading decision, transmission power, and CPU 
capability under interference environment in multi-user MEC 
system; however, our proposed algorithm has low 
computational complexity and information exchange, so the 
disadvantages of traditional optimization approach can be 
overcame. Compared with the game theory based algorithms 
(i.e., the algorithms that proposed in [5] and [6]), except 
offloading decision, channel allocation, and CPU capability, 
our proposed algorithm can also take the transmission power 
control into account in interference-aware multi-user MEC 
system; thus, our proposed algorithm has much better 
performances than that presented in [5] and [6].  
D. Technical Challenges and Solutions 
There are some technical challenges to solve the problems 
presented in Section I.A. The first technical challenge is to join 
offloading decision, CPU capacity adjustment, transmission 
power control, and channel allocation together in a game. This 
is a technical challenge because of two reasons: (1) the feasible 
regions of communication channel and transmission power are 
not continuous; the communication channel is not continuous is 
obvious; however, due to the interference, the transmission 
power should make the Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio 
(SINR) at MEC server larger than threshold; thus, the feasible 
region of transmission power should be 𝑝 ∈ {0, [𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛,  𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥]}; 
(2) these parameters are related, so it is complicated for the 
game to reach NE. To address this challenge, first, we introduce 
potential game into our algorithm; based on the theory proposed 
in [19-20, 28], we take the neighbors’ utilities into account to 
construct potential function and prove that the NE of this game 
exists; second, we introduce the best response strategy into our 
algorithm to reach NE. During the execution process, first of all, 
the mobile users get the channel interference information from 
the Base station (BS); based on the channel interference 
information, each mobile user calculates the best response of 
offloading decision, transmission power, and CPU capacity 
locally; each mobile user adjusts their offloading decision, 
transmission power, and CPU capacity to these values. This 
process will be repeated until the NE of this game is reached. 
The second technical challenge is to calculate the best response 
of offloading decision, transmission power, and CPU capacity. 
This is a technical challenge because of the interaction between 
different users, which makes the calculation difficult. To 
address this technical challenge, in this paper, we propose a set 
of algorithms to calculate the best response of these four 
parameters. The third technical challenge is to prove the 
proposed algorithm is effective and can reach NE. This is a 
technical challenge since the proposed game theory based 
algorithm takes more parameters into account than the previous 
works, which makes the analysis of the proposed algorithm 
difficult. To address this challenge, in this paper, we have 
proved that: (1) our proposed game theory based algorithm is 
convergent, and the NE of this game exists and is Pareto 
efficiency; (2) our proposed algorithm is Polynomial Local 
Search complete, which means that our algorithm can be 
finished in polynomial time; (3) the computational complexity 
of our proposed algorithm is 𝑂[𝐶𝑛 log3(𝑛)]; (4) reducing the 
interference between mobile users can improve the 
performances of MEC effectively. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
The main purpose of MEC is to reduce energy consumption 
and latency by carefully designing the task offloading scheme 
and resources allocation manner [1-4], which has been learned 
separately or jointly in both the single-user and multi-user MEC 
system [6-18]. In [6], the author proposes a game theory 
approach which can achieve efficient computation offloading 
for mobile cloud computing; the authors in [5] apply the 
conclusions in [6] into the multi-user MEC system and propose 
a game theory based offloading decision algorithm; in this 
algorithm, the mobile users decide whether to offload the tasks 
to MEC servers and which communication channels are used in 
a distributed manner. However, in these two algorithms, only 
the interference, the CPU capability, and the offloading 
decision are considered. Even the authors in these two papers 
propose that power control is a potential approach to minimize 
network interference and improve the performance of MEC, 
they fail to find a solution to overcome this problem. In [7], the 
authors propose an optimal offloading policy for the 
applications which include sequential component dependency 
graphs and multi-radio enabled mobile devices. Different from 
the algorithm shown in [7], the authors in [8] solve the task 
offloading issues for arbitrary dependency graphics. In [9], the 
authors propose an effective computation model for the MEC 
system, which joints the computation and communication 
cooperation together to improve the system performances.  
As the points of view that are proposed in [1] and [2], not 
only the offloading decision but also resources management is 
important for improving the performance of the MEC system. 
Resources management includes communication channel 
allocation, CPU capability control, transmission power control, 
etc. [10]. For instance, the task offloading decision and the 
computational frequency scaling are learned jointly in [10]; in 
this paper, the latency and energy consumption are minimized 
by jointly optimizing the task allocation decision and CPU 
frequency of the mobile user. In [11], the computational speed 
and transmission power of the mobile devices and the 
offloading ratio are optimized jointly for reducing energy 
consumption and latency via dynamic voltage scaling 
technology. In [12], the transmission power control and 
offloading decision in the MEC system under a single-user 
scenario are investigated. As an improvement, the authors in 
[13] and [14] expand the conclusions in [12] to the multi-user 
MEC system and combine with the resource allocation to 
improve the performance of multi-user MEC system by 
Lyapunov optimization. Similar to [13], the authors in [15] 
proposed a centralized algorithm for a multi-server multi-user 
MEC system, which joints the task offloading and resources 
allocation together. The service delay in MEC is reduced in [16] 
through virtual machine migration and transmission power 
control; the users transmit data to cloudlet in a round robin 
fashion and the service delay is reduced by controlling cloudlets’ 
transmission power. In [17], an integrated framework for 
computation offloading and interference management in the 
MEC system is proposed. We have also investigated the 
  
 
 
transmission power issues in a multi-user interference-aware 
MEC system [39]; however, in [39], the task offloading 
decision is not considered. But, the [12] is proposed for single-
user MEC system; the algorithm proposed in [16] is mainly for 
the cloudlets rather than the mobile users; the algorithms 
proposed in [13], [14], [15], and [17] are effective in multi-user 
MEC system, but they are centralized; Moreover, for the 
algorithms introduce above, the feasible region of the 
transmission power is assumed from 0 to maximum; however, 
due to the existence of the interference, the transmission power 
should make the SINR at the MEC server larger than the 
threshold; thus, the feasible region of the transmission power 
should be 𝑝 ∈ {0, [𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛,  𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥]}, which will put forward a new 
challenge for calculating the transmission power of mobile 
users. 
III. SYSTEM MODEL 
There are N mobile users in the network, denoted as 𝑵 =
{1, 2, … , 𝑁}. The mobile users are served by the BS. In MEC, 
the FDMA is used in the upper link communication for the task 
offloading from mobile user to MEC server [18-20]. In FDMA, 
the available spectrum is divided into K subchannels and the 
index of these subchannels is 𝑲 = {1, 2, … , 𝐾}. In this paper, as 
[10-15], we only consider the fixed channel allocation, i.e., the 
channel has been allocated to the mobile users by the BS; in the 
further version, we will consider introducing the channel 
allocation into this algorithm, which is interesting and 
challenging. In the MEC system, each mobile user has a 
computation-intensive task, which can be calculated locally or 
offloaded to the MEC server through the BS that deployed 
proximity to the user. There are two offloading models for 
mobile users [1]: binary offloading and partial offloading. In 
this paper, for unifying these two schemas, we introduce the 
offloading ratio, like that used in [9] and [11], into the 
offloading decision.  
Definition 1. The offloading ratio 𝜆 ∈ [0, 1] is defined as the 
ratio of the computation tasks that offloaded to MEC server; 
when 𝜆 = 0 or 𝜆 = 1, it is binary offloading; when 𝜆 ∈ (0, 1), 
it is partial offloading.  
Based on Definition 1, the ratio of the computation task that 
executed locally is 1 −  . The transmission power of the 
mobile user can be adjusted from 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 to 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥. In the wireless 
networks, the minimum transmission power 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 should make 
the SINR larger than the threshold [18]. Note that when 𝜆 = 0, 
the computation task will be executed locally, which means 
𝑝 = 0; when 𝜆 ≠ 0, the task needs to be offloaded to the MEC 
server and 𝑝 ≠ 0; so the feasible region of the transmission 
power, which takes the task offloading decision and SINR into 
account, is 𝑝 ∈ {0, [𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛,  𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥]}. This means that the feasible 
region of transmission power is not continuous anymore, which 
will put forward a challenge on the transmission power control. 
For more clearer, the notations that will be used in this paper are 
listed in the table below. 
 
TABLE 1.  
The notations are used in this paper 
Notations Meanings 
N The number of mobile users in the network 
n One of the mobile user 
K The number of subchannels 
𝑘  One of the subchannel 
 𝜆𝑛  The offloading decision of user n  
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(, 𝒑)   The data rate of user n when offloads task  
𝑤𝑘  The bandwidth of channel 𝑘 
𝐼𝑛
𝑘  The interference at user n by channel k 
𝑝𝑛  The transmission power of user n 
Γ𝑛
𝑘  The interference of user n by using channel k 
𝑇𝑛  The computation task of user n 
𝐿𝑛  The size of  𝑇𝑛 
𝑐𝑛  The CPU cycles that are needed to process 𝑇𝑛 
𝑡𝑛,𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠
𝑘   The time that is needed to transmit data from 
user to MEC server 
𝑡𝑛
𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑑  The time that is needed for task executing in 
MEC server  
𝑓𝑐  The CPU capability of MEC server 
𝑒𝑛,𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠
𝑘   The energy consumption that is caused by data 
transmission from user to MEC server 
𝑓𝑛  The CPU capability of user n 
𝑂𝑛
𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑑  The overhead of mobile user n for offloading the 
computation task to the MEC server 
𝑂𝑛
𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙  The overhead of mobile user n for executing the 
task locally 
𝑠𝑛  The strategy of mobile user n 
𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑛)  The computation overhead of use n that takes the 
uses in 𝐼𝑛
𝑘 into account 
 
A. Communication Model 
Notice that here we focus on exploring the computation 
offloading problem under the wireless interference model. This 
model can well capture user's average aggregate throughput in 
the cellular communication scenario, and some physical layer 
channel access schemes are adapted to allow multiple users to 
share the same spectrum resources simultaneously and 
efficiently. We define the interference users set of user n in 
channel k as: the set of mobile users which use channel k to 
transmit data to the MEC server, denoted as 𝐼𝑛
𝑘. Therefore, the 
interference of user n by using channel k to offload the task to 
MEC server through channel k is: Γ𝑛
𝑘 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑖∈𝐼𝑛𝑘, 𝑖>0 𝐺𝑖. Based 
on the Shannon-Hartley formula [24], the transmission rate of 
mobile user n can be calculated as:   
 𝑟𝑛
𝑘(, 𝒑) = 𝑘 log2 (1 +
𝑝𝑛𝐺𝑛
𝑁0+Γ𝑛
𝑘)         (1) 
where 𝑘 is the wireless channel bandwidth; N0 is the power of 
Gaussian white noise; Gn is the channel gain between mobile 
user n and BS;  is the set of offloading decisions of the mobile 
users and  = {1,2, … , 𝑁} ; 𝒑  is the set of transmission 
powers of the mobile users and 𝒑 = {𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑁}. From (1), 
we can find that the transmission rate of the mobile user n not 
only relates to its transmission power and offloading decision 
but also that of the interference users. The transmission of user 
n is affected by the interference users, and user n also affects 
the transmission of other users. Due to the interaction between 
user n and its interference users, the power control and the 
offloading decision are coupled.  
In order to quantify the interference, two kinds of 
interference sets of user n are defined: (1) the set of users in 𝐼𝑛
𝑘 
and can affect the data transmission of user n is defined as 𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑖𝑛
, 
where 𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑖𝑛 ∈ 𝐼𝑛
𝑘; (2) the set of users in 𝐼𝑛
𝑘 and can be affected 
  
 
 
by the data transmission of user n is defined as 𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡
 and  
𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡 ∈ 𝐼𝑛
𝑘 . In the following, we will show that these two 
interference sets are equal. In MEC, when user i decides to 
offload its task to the MEC server, the SINR of user i at MEC 
server should be larger than the threshold; the interference of 
user i comes from the users which use the same channel as user 
i; all the users who use this channel and offload the task to the 
MEC server can interfere the task offloading of user i. The same, 
user i can interfere all the users who use the same channel as i. 
Thus, we have  𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑖𝑛 = 𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 𝐼𝑛
𝑘 . Moreover,  𝐼𝑛
𝑘 can be got 
from the MEC server. In the following of this paper, we will 
use 𝐼𝑛
𝑘 to represent 𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑜𝑢𝑡
 and 𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝑖𝑛
. 
B. Computation Model 
For mobile user n, there is a computation task 𝑇𝑛 = {𝐿𝑛, 𝐶𝑛} 
which can be calculated locally or offloaded to the MEC server. 
The Ln is the length of the input data (bits) and Cn is the 
computation workload (CPU cycles needed for one-bit data).  
B.1 Computation Model of Local Execution  
When 𝜆𝑛 = 0, the computation task Tn is executed locally, 
then 𝑝𝑛 = 0 and 𝑟𝑛(𝝀, 𝒑) = 0; thus, the latency for calculating 
this task can be shown as:  
 𝑡𝑛
𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 =
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑛
    (2) 
where 𝑓𝑛 is the CPU cycles per second (i.e., the computation 
capability) of user n with the upper bound is 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥. Different 
mobile users have different computation capabilities and each 
mobile user can adjust its computation capability from 0 to 
𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥 . Based on [5] and [13], the energy consumption for 
calculating the computation task Tn is:  
 𝑒𝑛
𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 = 𝜅𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑛
2   (3) 
In (3), 𝜅𝑛 is a constant related to the hardware architecture 
of mobile device n. The dynamic power consumption is 
proportional to 𝑉𝑐
2𝑓𝑛 , where Vc is the circuit supply voltage. 
When the operating voltage is low, the CPU frequency is 
approximately linear proportional to the voltage supply [13, 25-
26]. Thus, the energy consumption of one CPU cycle is 𝜅𝑛𝑓𝑛
2. 
According to (2) and (3), based on the overhead defined in [5], 
the overhead of local computing is: 
 𝑂𝑛
𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 = 𝛼𝑡,𝑛
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑛
+ 𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑛
2   (4) 
where 𝛼𝑡,𝑛, 𝛼𝑒,𝑛 ∈ [0,1] denote the weights of computational 
latency and energy for user n's decision making, respectively 
[5,6]. When user n cares about energy consumption, the user n 
can set 𝛼𝑡,𝑛 = 0  and 𝛼𝑒,𝑛 = 1 ; otherwise, when user n is 
sensitive to delay, then user n can set 𝛼𝑡,𝑛 = 1 and 𝛼𝑒,𝑛 = 0. 
This model can take both computational latency and energy 
consumption into decision making at the same time. In practice, 
the proper weights can be determined by the multi-attribute 
utility approach in multi-criteria decision-making theory [27]. 
B.2 Computation Model of MEC server 
When 𝜆𝑛 > 0, part of or all of the computation tasks are 
offloaded to the MEC server, where 𝑝𝑛 ∈ [𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥]  and 
𝑟𝑛(𝝀, 𝒑) > 0 . Assuming that the communication channel 
assigned to mobile user n is k, the latency for transmitting the 
input data to the MEC server can be calculated as:  
 𝑡𝑛,𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠
𝑘 =
𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
        (5) 
If the transmission power of mobile user n for transmitting 
the computation task to MEC server through channel k is 𝑝𝑛
𝑘, 
the energy consumption of the data transmission is:  
  𝑒𝑛,𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠
𝑘 = 𝑝𝑛
𝑘𝑡𝑛,𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑑
𝑘 =
𝑝𝑛
𝑘𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
       (6) 
When the input data is offloaded to the MEC server, the 
MEC server calculates the computation task based on the input 
data. According to (2), the latency of task execution in MEC 
server is: 
  𝑡𝑛
𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑑 =
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑐
         (7) 
where 𝑓𝑐 is the CPU cycle per second of the MEC server.  
Therefore, based on (5), (6), and (7), the overhead of cloud 
computing can be calculated as: 
 𝑂𝑛
𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑑 = 𝛼𝑡,𝑛(𝑡𝑛,𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠
𝑘 + 𝑡𝑛
𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑑) + 𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝑒𝑛,𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠
𝑘          (8) 
According to the offloading decision ratio n, the length of 
the input data that calculated locally is (1 − 𝜆𝑛)𝐿𝑛  and the 
length of the input data that offloaded to the MEC server is 
𝜆𝑛𝐿𝑛 [9][11]. Thus, the whole computation overhead of user n, 
which takes the overheads of local computing and cloud 
computing into account, can be calculated as:  
𝑂𝑛 = 𝛼𝑡,𝑛 (
𝜆𝑛𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
+
𝜆𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑐
+
(1−𝜆𝑛)𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑛
)  
+𝛼𝑒,𝑛 (
𝜆𝑛𝑝𝑛
𝑘𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
 + (1 − 𝜆𝑛)𝜅𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑛
2)            (9)  
IV. JOINT TASK OFFLOADING AND RESOURCES 
ALLOCATION GAME 
Based on Section 1.3, the problem needs to be solved in this 
paper can be shown in P1: 
𝐏𝟏:    min
𝑛∈𝑵
𝑂𝑛(𝜆𝑛, 𝑝𝑛, 𝑓𝑛)  
           𝑠. 𝑡.    0 ≤ 𝜆𝑛 ≤ 1, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑵                              (a) 
                    𝑝𝑛 ∈ {
[𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥], 𝜆𝑛 > 0, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑵
{0},                  𝜆𝑛 = 0, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑵
      (b)                 (10) 
                     0 ≤ 𝑓𝑛 ≤ 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥 , 𝑛 ∈ 𝑵                         (c) 
According to the P1 shown in (10), we define the multi-user 
game as: 𝐺 = (𝑵, {𝑺𝑛}𝑛∈𝑵, {𝑂𝑛}𝑛∈𝑵), where 𝑺𝑛 = 𝝀𝑛⨂ 𝒑𝑛⊗
𝒇𝑛 is the strategy space of mobile user n; 𝝀𝑛, 𝒑𝑛, and 𝒇𝑛 are the 
strategy spaces of offloading decision, transmission power, and 
CPU capability of user n, respectively, i.e., 𝜆𝑛 ∈ 𝝀𝑛, 𝑝𝑛 ∈ 𝒑𝑛, 
and 𝑓𝑛 ∈ 𝒇𝑛 . For each strategy of user n, 𝑠𝑛 ∈ 𝑺𝑛  and 𝑠𝑛 =
{𝜆𝑛, 𝑝𝑛, 𝑓𝑛}. Moreover, 𝑺 =  {𝑺1, 𝑺2, … , 𝑺𝑁} is the strategy space 
set of all mobile users. The utility function of mobile user n is 
𝑂𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛), in which 𝑠−𝑛  =  (𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑛−1, 𝑠𝑛+1, … , 𝑠𝑁) is the 
set of strategies of all the others mobile users except user n. So 
the game 𝐺 can be stated as that for given 𝑠−𝑛 (can be gotten 
from the BS), the mobile user n would like to choose a proper 
strategy 𝑠𝑛 = {𝜆𝑛, 𝑝𝑛, 𝑓𝑛}  to minimize its computation 
overhead, i.e., 
  
 
 
 𝐺:    min
𝑠𝑛∈𝑺𝑛
𝑂𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) , ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑵      (11) 
However, as discussed in (1), the offloading decision of user 
n can affect the performances of users in 𝐼𝑛
𝑘 ; moreover, 
according to the conclusions in [19], [20], and [28], the 
approach which defines the individual computation overhead as 
the utility of each user is selfish. So, the local altruistic 
behaviors among neighboring users, which are motivated by 
local cooperation in biographical systems [29-30], are 
introduced into the utility function construction [19-20, 28]. In 
game 𝐺, when the strategy of user n changes, the computation 
overheads of the users in 𝐼𝑛
𝑘 are affected; therefore, in the new 
overhead function, it is better to take the computation overhead 
of the users in 𝐼𝑛
𝑘  into account [19][20][28], which can be 
expressed as:  
 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑛) = 𝑂𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) + ∑ 𝑂𝑖(𝑠𝑖,𝑠𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑖)𝑖∈𝐼𝑛𝑘     (12) 
where 𝑠𝑖,𝑠𝑛  means the strategy of user 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝑛
𝑘  when the 
strategy of user n is 𝑠𝑛. In (12), the first term in the right hand 
is the computation overhead of user n; the second term is the 
aggregated computation overhead of the users in 𝐼𝑛
𝑘. Then the 
new local altruistic game 𝐺′is: 
 𝐺′:     min𝑠𝑛∈𝑺𝑛𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛), ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑵     (13) 
Based on the definition of game 𝐺′in (13), we define the NE 
of game 𝐺′as follows.  
Definition 2. A strategy profile 𝒔∗ = {𝑠1
∗, 𝑠2
∗, . . . , 𝑠𝑁
∗ } is a NE of 
game 𝐺′, if at the NE point s*, no mobile user can reduce their 
computation overhead by changing the strategy unilaterally. 
The mathematic formula expression is: for ∀𝑠𝑛 ∈ 𝑺𝑛 and ∀𝑛 ∈
𝑵, 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛
∗ , 𝑠−𝑛
∗ ) ≤ 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑛
∗ ) holds. 
At the NE point, each user cannot find a better strategy than 
the current one when the other users do not change their 
strategies. This property is important to the distributed issues, 
since each mobile user minimizes their own overhead based on 
their own interests, which will reduce the information exchange 
between mobile users and the MEC server.  
A. The Existence and property of Nash Equilibrium 
Since the computation overhead 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)  and the 
strategy space of transmission power 𝑝𝑛 are not continuous, so 
we introduce the potential game into the proving of the 
existence and uniqueness of NE. For proving that 𝐺′  is a 
potential game, first, we define the potential game in Definition 
3. 
Definition 3 [31][32]. A game is an exact potential game if 
there exists a potential function  such that for ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑵 and 
∀𝑠𝑛, s𝑛
′ , 𝑠−𝑛 ∈ 𝑺𝑛, the following conditions hold: 
𝑈𝑛(s𝑛
′ , 𝑠−𝑛) − 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) = Φ(s𝑛
′ , 𝑠−𝑛) − Φ(𝑠𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑛)        (14) 
Remark 1: For the exact potential game, if any mobile user 
changes its strategy (i.e., from 𝑠𝑛  to s𝑛
′ ), the variation in the 
overhead function equals to that in the potential function. The 
important property of the potential game is that there always 
exists a NE and the asynchronous better response update 
process must be finite and leads to a NE [31-32].  
Theorem 1. The game 𝐺′ shown in (13) is an exact potential 
game; and the game 𝐺′  always has a Nash equilibrium and 
finite improvement property. 
Proof. Based on the conclusions in [19], [20], and [28], we 
define the potential function as: 
Φ(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) = ∑ 𝑂𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑛∈𝑵   
  = 𝑂𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) + ∑ 𝑂𝑖(𝑠𝑖,𝑠𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑖)𝑖∈𝐼𝑛𝑘 + 
  ∑ 𝑂𝑗(𝑠𝑗,𝑠𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑗)𝑗∈𝑁\𝐼𝑛𝑘\{𝑛}       (15) 
The (15) can be divided into three terms. The first term in 
the right hand is the computation overhead of mobile user n; the 
second term represents the summary of the overheads of the 
users in 𝐼𝑛
𝑘; the third term is the computation overhead of the 
rest mobile users in the network. Since there are three variables 
in 𝑠𝑛, so there will be ∑ 𝐶3
𝑖3
𝑖=1 = 7 different changing models 
of 𝑠𝑛. If we calculate the variation of the computation overhead 
function and the potential function based on all the changing 
models of 𝑠𝑛, it will be complex. However, the variables in 𝑠𝑛 
can be divided into two different groups: 1) 𝜆𝑛 and 𝑝𝑛; these 
two variables can not only affect the overhead of user n but also 
the users in  𝐼𝑛
𝑘 , denoted as 𝑝𝑎𝑟I; 2) 𝑓𝑛 ; when this variable 
changes, only the overhead of user n is affected, denoted as 
𝑝𝑎𝑟II.  
When 𝑝𝑎𝑟I changes, i.e., 𝜆𝑛 or 𝑝𝑛 changes or both of these 
two variables change, no matter the  𝑝𝑎𝑟II changes or not, the 
overheads of user n and the users in 𝐼𝑛
𝑘 change; the computation 
overheads of the rest users (i.e., the users in 𝑁\𝐼𝑛
𝑘\{𝑛}) do not 
change, because the strategy changing of user n cannot affect 
the mobile users which are not in 𝐼𝑛
𝑘 . The deviation of the 
computation overhead when the user n’s strategy changes from 
𝑠𝑛 to s𝑛
′  can be calculated: 
𝑈𝑛(s𝑛
′ , 𝑠−𝑛) − 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)  
= 𝑂𝑛(s𝑛
′ , 𝑠−𝑛) − 𝑂𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) + ∑ 𝑂𝑖(𝑠𝑖,𝑠𝑛′ , 𝑠−𝑖)𝑖∈𝐼𝑛𝑘           
−∑ 𝑂𝑖(𝑠𝑖,𝑠𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑖)𝑖∈𝐼𝑛𝑘            (16) 
According to (15), the variation of the potential function is:  
Φ(s𝑛
′ , 𝑠−𝑛) − Φ(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)  
= 𝑂𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) − 𝑂𝑛(s𝑛
′ , 𝑠−𝑛) + ∑ 𝑂𝑖(𝑠𝑖,𝑠𝑛′ , 𝑠−𝑖)𝑖∈𝐼𝑛𝑘   
−∑ 𝑂𝑖(𝑠𝑖,𝑠𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑖)𝑖∈𝐼𝑛𝑘 + ∑ 𝑂𝑗(𝑠𝑗,𝑠𝑛′ , 𝑠−𝑗)𝑗∈𝑁\𝐼𝑛𝑘\{𝑛}   
−∑ 𝑂𝑗(𝑠𝑗,𝑠𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑗)𝑗∈𝑁\𝐼𝑛𝑘\{𝑛}          (17) 
As shown in (17), ∑ 𝑂𝑗(𝑠𝑗,𝑠𝑛′ , 𝑠−𝑗)𝑗∈𝑁\𝐼𝑛𝑘\{𝑛} −
∑ 𝑂𝑗(𝑠𝑗,𝑠𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑗)𝑗∈𝑁\𝐼𝑛𝑘\{𝑛} = 0 , so 𝑈𝑛(s𝑛
′ , 𝑠−𝑛) − 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑛) =
Φ(s𝑛
′ , 𝑠−𝑛) − Φ(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)  holds.     
When the 𝑝𝑎𝑟II changes and the 𝑝𝑎𝑟I does not change, the 
computation overhead of the other mobile users except user n 
keeps constant. So based on (16),  ∑ 𝑂𝑖(𝑠𝑖,𝑠𝑛′ , 𝑠−𝑖)𝑖∈𝐼𝑛𝑘 −
∑ 𝑂𝑖(𝑠𝑖,𝑠𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑖)𝑖∈𝐼𝑛𝑘 = 0  and ∑ 𝑂𝑗(𝑠𝑗,𝑠𝑛′ , 𝑠−𝑗)𝑗∈𝑁\𝐼𝑛𝑘\{𝑛} −
∑ 𝑂𝑗(𝑠𝑗,𝑠𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑗)𝑗∈𝑁\𝐼𝑛𝑘\{𝑛} = 0. Thus, the conclusion in (14) holds. 
Therefore, the  𝐺′ is an exact potential game.        
Based on the conclusions in [5], [31], [32], and [34], since 
the game 𝐺′ is an exact potential game, so it always has a Nash 
equilibrium and the finite improvement property.   ■ 
  
 
 
B. The best response strategy 
For the game which the existence of NE is guaranteed, the 
best-response dynamic always converges to a NE [33-34], so it 
is applied in this algorithm to reach the NE of game 𝐺′. In the 
best response strategy, each mobile user calculates the best 
response of the variables in s according to the information that 
gotten from BS, i.e., for given 𝑠−𝑛, user n calculates the best 
response of 𝜆𝑛, 𝑝𝑛, and 𝑓𝑛 based on (12).  
Corollary 1. For ∀𝑝𝑛 ∈ 𝒑𝑛 and ∀𝑓𝑛 ∈ 𝒇𝑛, the best response of  
𝜆𝑛 will be 𝜆𝑛 = 0 or 𝜆𝑛 = 1.  
Proof. Based on 𝑂𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) , the computation overhead 
function of game 𝐺′ can be expressed as: 
𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) = 𝛼𝑡,𝑛 (
𝜆𝑛𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
+
𝜆𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑐
+
(1−𝜆𝑛)𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑛
)  
+𝛼𝑒,𝑛 (
𝜆𝑛𝑝𝑛
𝑘𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
 + (1 − 𝜆𝑛)𝜅𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑛
2)        
  +∑ (𝛼𝑡,𝑖 (
𝜆𝑖𝐿𝑖
𝑟𝑖
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
+
𝜆𝑖𝐿𝑖𝐶𝑖
𝑓𝑐
+
(1−𝜆𝑖)𝐿𝑖𝐶𝑖
𝑓𝑖
)𝑖∈𝐼𝑛𝑘  
+𝛼𝑒,𝑖 (
𝜆𝑖𝑝𝑖
𝑘𝐿𝑖
𝑟𝑖
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
 + (1 − 𝜆𝑖)𝜅𝑖𝐿𝑖𝐶𝑖𝑓𝑖
2))           (18) 
Since when 𝜆𝑛 = 0 , 𝑝𝑛 = 0 , when 𝜆𝑛 ≠ 0 , 𝑝𝑛 ∈
[𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥], so the 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) is not continuous. For solving 
this issues, the value of 𝜆𝑛 is divided into two parts: 1) 𝜆𝑛 ∈
[𝜀, 1], where  is small enough and can near to 0 arbitrarily, then  
𝑝𝑛 ∈ [𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥]; 2) 𝜆𝑛 = 0, then 𝑝𝑛 = 0. When 𝜆𝑛 ∈ [𝜀, 1] 
and 𝑝𝑛 ≠ 0, the third term in (18) has no relation with 𝜆𝑛 , 
because according to (1), when 𝜆𝑛 ∈ [𝜀, 1] > 0, the user n will 
interfere the users in 𝐼𝑛
𝑘  no matter what the value of 𝜆𝑛  is. 
Obviously, the 𝑂𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) is a linear function on 𝜆𝑛 ; so the 
extreme value of 𝑂𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) will be gotten when 𝜆𝑛 = 𝜀  or 
𝜆𝑛 = 1 . When 𝛼𝑡,𝑛 (
𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
+
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑐
) + 𝛼𝑒,𝑛
𝑝𝑛
𝑘𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
 > 𝛼𝑡,𝑛
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑛
+
𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑛
2, the 𝑂𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) is an increasing function and the 
minimum computation overhead can be gotten when 𝜆𝑛 = 𝜀. 
Thus, when 𝜀 → 0, the 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) can be calculated as: 
lim
𝜀→0
𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) = 𝛼𝑡,𝑛
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑛
+ 𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑛
2                          
+∑ (𝛼𝑡,𝑖 (
𝜆𝑖𝐿𝑖
𝑟𝑖,𝑝𝑛≠0
𝑘 (𝝀,𝒑)
+
𝜆𝑖𝐿𝑖𝐶𝑖
𝑓𝑐
+
(1−𝜆𝑖)𝐿𝑖𝐶𝑖
𝑓𝑖
)𝑖∈𝐼𝑛𝑘                                                                       
+𝛼𝑒,𝑖 (
𝜆𝑖𝑝𝑖
𝑘𝐿𝑖
𝑟𝑖,𝑝𝑛≠0
𝑘 (𝝀,𝒑)
 + (1 − 𝜆𝑖)𝜅𝑖𝐿𝑖𝐶𝑖𝑓𝑖
2))             (19) 
When 𝛼𝑡,𝑛 (
𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
+
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑐
) + 𝛼𝑒,𝑛
𝑝𝑛
𝑘𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
< 𝛼𝑡,𝑛
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑛
+
𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑛
2, the 𝑂𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) is a decreasing function; so the 
minimum overhead will be gotten when 𝜆𝑛 = 1, which is: 
 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑛)|𝜆𝑛=1 = 𝛼𝑡,𝑛 (
𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
+
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑐
) + 𝛼𝑒,𝑛
𝑝𝑛
𝑘𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
 
+∑ (𝛼𝑡,𝑖 (
𝜆𝑖𝐿𝑖
𝑟𝑖,𝑝𝑛≠0
𝑘 (𝝀,𝒑)
+
𝜆𝑖𝐿𝑖𝐶𝑖
𝑓𝑐
+
(1−𝜆𝑖)𝐿𝑖𝐶𝑖
𝑓𝑖
)𝑖∈𝐼𝑛𝑘    
+𝛼𝑒,𝑖 (
𝜆𝑖𝑝𝑖
𝑘𝐿𝑖
𝑟𝑖,𝑝𝑛≠0
𝑘 (𝝀,𝒑)
 + (1 − 𝜆𝑖)𝜅𝑖𝐿𝑖𝐶𝑖𝑓𝑖
2))    (20) 
When 𝜆𝑛 = 0, the computation overhead shown in (18) can 
be calculated as: 
𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)|𝜆𝑛=0 = 𝛼𝑡,𝑛
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑛
+ 𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑛
2  
+∑ (𝛼𝑡,𝑖 (
𝜆𝑖𝐿𝑖
𝑟𝑖,𝑝𝑛=0
𝑘 (𝝀,𝒑)
+
𝜆𝑖𝐿𝑖𝐶𝑖
𝑓𝑐
+
(1−𝜆𝑖)𝐿𝑖𝐶𝑖
𝑓𝑖
)𝑖∈𝐼𝑛𝑘   
                        +𝛼𝑒,𝑖 (
𝜆𝑖𝑝𝑖
𝑘𝐿𝑖
𝑟𝑖,𝑝𝑛=o
𝑘 (𝝀,𝒑)
 + (1 − 𝜆𝑖)𝜅𝑖𝐿𝑖𝐶𝑖𝑓𝑖
2))    (21)  
According to (1), we have 𝑟𝑖,𝑝𝑛≠0
𝑘 (𝝀, 𝒑) = 𝑘 log2 (1 +
𝑝𝑖
𝑘𝐺𝑖
𝑁0+∑ 𝑝𝑗
𝑘
𝑗∈𝐼𝑖
𝑘 𝐺𝑗+𝑝𝑛
𝑘𝐺𝑛
)  and 𝑟𝑖,𝑝𝑛=0
𝑘 (𝝀, 𝒑) = 𝑘 log2 (1 +
𝑝𝑖
𝑘𝐺𝑖
𝑁0+∑ 𝑝𝑗
𝑘
𝑗∈𝐼𝑖
𝑘 𝐺𝑗
) , 
so 𝑟𝑖,𝑝𝑛≠0
𝑘 (𝝀, 𝒑) < 𝑟𝑖,𝑝𝑛=0
𝑘 (𝝀, 𝒑); therefore, based on (19) and (21), 
lim
𝜀→0
𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) > 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)|𝜆𝑛=0 . So in this case, the best 
response of  𝜆𝑛 is 𝜆𝑛 = 0.  
When 𝛼𝑡,𝑛 (
𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
+
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑐
) + 𝛼𝑒,𝑛
𝑝𝑛
𝑘𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
< 𝛼𝑡,𝑛
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑛
+
𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑛
2 , the overhead function shown in (18) is a 
decreasing function. On the one hand, the first two terms in (20) 
are smaller than that in (21); on the other hand, the third term 
in (20) is larger than that in (21) due to 𝑟𝑖,𝑝𝑛≠0
𝑘 (𝝀, 𝒑) <
𝑟𝑖,𝑝𝑛=0
𝑘 (𝝀, 𝒑). This means that 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)|𝜆𝑛=1 may larger or 
smaller than 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)|𝜆𝑛=0. Therefore, in this case, the best 
response of 𝜆𝑛 is 𝜆𝑛 = 1 or 𝜆𝑛 = 0 according to the values of 
𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)|𝜆𝑛=1  and 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)|𝜆𝑛=0 . Thus, Corollary 1 
holds.                  ■ 
Remark 2: In the proof of Corollary 1, when 𝛼𝑡,𝑛 (
𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
+
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑐
) + 𝛼𝑒,𝑛
𝑝𝑛
𝑘𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
> 𝛼𝑡,𝑛
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑛
+ 𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑛
2, the value of 𝜆𝑛 is 
𝜆𝑛 = 0. This is easy to be understood; since in this case, the 
task is calculated locally costs less resource than that in the 
MEC server. However, when 𝛼𝑡,𝑛 (
𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
+
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑐
) + 𝛼𝑒,𝑛
𝑝𝑛
𝑘𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
<
𝛼𝑡,𝑛
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑛
+ 𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑛
2, the best response of  𝜆𝑛 is 𝜆𝑛 = 1 or 
𝜆𝑛 = 0; this means that even the user n’s computation overhead 
of cloud computing is smaller than that of local computing, 
considering the overheads of the users in 𝐼𝑛
𝑘, the user n may not 
offloads its task to MEC server.  
Corollary 2. The best response of the CPU capability 𝑓𝑛 is 𝑓𝑛 =
(𝛼𝑡,𝑛 2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛⁄ )
1/3
or 𝑓𝑛 = 0.  
Proof. When 𝜆𝑛 ≠ 0, 𝑓𝑛 = 0; only when 𝜆𝑛 = 0, 𝑓𝑛 ∈ (0, 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥]. 
Thus, when 𝜆𝑛 = 1, the best response of 𝑓𝑛  is 𝑓𝑛 = 0. When 
𝜆𝑛 = 0, the computation overhead function is shown in (21). 
The first derivative of (21) on 𝑓𝑛  is: 𝑈𝑛
′ (𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)|𝑓𝑛 =
2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛𝑓𝑛 − 𝛼𝑡,𝑛
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑛
2  . When 𝑈𝑛
′ (𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)|𝑓𝑛 = 0 , 𝑓𝑛 =
(𝛼𝑡,𝑛 2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛⁄ )
1/3
; moreover, since 𝑈𝑛
′′(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)|𝑓𝑛 =
2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛 + 2𝛼𝑡,𝑛
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛
𝑓𝑛
3 > 0 , so when 𝑓𝑛 = (𝛼𝑡,𝑛 2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛⁄ )
1/3
, 
the 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)  can get the minimum value. Thus, the best 
response of the CPU capability 𝑓𝑛 is 𝑓𝑛 = (𝛼𝑡,𝑛 2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛⁄ )
1/3
 or 
𝑓𝑛 = 0.          ■ 
Corollary 3. For ∀𝜆𝑛 ∈ {0,1}, the best response of  𝑝𝑛 exists 
and 𝑝𝑛 = 0  or 𝑝𝑛 = ?̅?𝑛 , where ?̅?𝑛 =
arg   min
𝑛∈𝑵
{𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛|𝑝𝑛=𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑛) , 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛|𝑝𝑛=𝑝𝑛′ , 𝑠−𝑛), 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛|𝑝𝑛=𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥 , 𝑠−𝑛)}. 
Proof. Since the best response of offloading decision is 𝜆𝑛 ∈
{0,1} and when  𝜆𝑛 = 0, 𝑝𝑛 = 0, so the best response of 𝑝𝑛 
when 𝜆𝑛 = 0 is 𝑝𝑛 = 0. When 𝜆𝑛 = 1, the task is offloaded to 
the MEC server. Since the delay and the energy consumption 
when the task is executed in MEC server have no relation with 
the transmission power, so we only consider the latency and the 
  
 
 
energy consumption caused by the data transmission. 
According to (18), the transmission overhead can be calculated 
as 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 = 𝛼𝑡,𝑛
𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
+ 𝛼𝑒,𝑛
𝑝𝑛
𝑘𝐿𝑛
𝑟𝑛
𝑘(𝝀,𝒑)
+ ∑ 𝑈𝑖(𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠−𝑖)𝑖∈𝐼𝑛𝑘 ; 
considering (1), the overhead of transmission can be written as: 
𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 = 𝑎𝑛
𝛼𝑡,𝑛+𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝑝𝑛
𝑘
ln(1+(𝑝𝑛
𝑘𝐺𝑛 Γ𝑛
𝑘⁄ ))
  
+∑
𝑏𝑖
ln(1+(𝑝𝑖
𝑘𝐺𝑖 𝑁0+𝑝𝑛
𝑘𝐺𝑛+∑ 𝑝𝑗
𝑘𝐺𝑗𝑗∈𝐼
𝑖
𝑘,𝑖𝑛{𝑛}
⁄ ))
𝑖∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘      (22) 
where 𝑎𝑛 = 𝐿𝑛 ln 2 𝑘⁄ , 𝑏𝑖 = 𝜆𝑖 𝐿𝑛(𝛼𝑡,𝑖 + 𝛼𝑒,𝑖𝑝𝑖
𝑘) ln 2 𝑘⁄ . The 
extreme value of (22) can be gotten when 
𝑈𝑛
′ (𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠|𝑝𝑛𝑘 = 0 . Since 𝑈𝑛
′ (𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠|𝑝𝑛𝑘 = 0  is a 
transcendental equation, so the analytical solution of 
𝑈𝑛
′ (𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠|𝑝𝑛𝑘 = 0 does not exist. The numerical solution 
of 𝑈𝑛
′ (𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠|𝑝𝑛𝑘 = 0  can be calculated by Newton 
Method. Let 𝑝𝑛
′  be the solution of 𝑈𝑛
′ (𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠|𝑝𝑛𝑘 = 0 ; 
since the solution of 𝑈𝑛
′ (𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠|𝑝𝑛𝑘 = 0 may not single, 
so we define the 𝑝𝑛
′  as: 𝑝𝑛
′ = arg  {𝑈𝑛
′ (𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠|𝑝𝑛𝑘 = 0} . 
Therefore, if 𝑝𝑛
′ = ∅ , the 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠  is a monotone 
function with 𝑝𝑛 ∈ [𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥], then the best response of  𝑝𝑛 
will be 𝑝𝑛 = 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 or 𝑝𝑛 = 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥. If 𝑝𝑛
′ ≠ ∅, the extreme value 
of (22) will be gotten at 𝑝𝑛
′ ; therefore, if 𝑝𝑛
′ ∈ [𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥], it 
means that the extreme value of (22) exists in the feasible 
region [𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥]; if 𝑝𝑛
′ ∉ [𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥], the extreme value of 
(22) can be gotten when 𝑝𝑛
′ = 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛  or 𝑝𝑛
′ = 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥 . Thus, the 
best response of the transmission power𝑝𝑛 can be calculated as 
?̅?𝑛 =
arg   min
𝑛∈𝑵
{𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛|𝑝𝑛=𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑛) , 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛|𝑝𝑛=𝑝𝑛′ , 𝑠−𝑛), 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛|𝑝𝑛=𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥 , 𝑠−𝑛)}.
Therefore, the best response of  𝑝𝑛 is 𝑝𝑛 = 0 or 𝑝𝑛 = ?̅?𝑛.       ■ 
Corollary 4. The best response of 𝜆𝑛  is decided by the 
interference from the mobile users in 𝐼𝑛
𝑘 and 𝐼𝑖
𝑘, where 𝐼𝑖
𝑘 is the 
set of the interference users which can affect the data 
transmission of user  𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝑛
𝑘. 
Proof. Since the best response of 𝜆𝑛 is 𝜆𝑛 = 0 or 𝜆𝑛 = 1, so the 
best response of 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) can be expressed as: 
𝑈𝑛
∗(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) =  
{
 
 
 
 
𝑈1
∗ = 𝑈𝑛
∗(𝑠𝑛|𝑝𝑛=?̅?𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 + 𝑈𝑛
∗(𝑠𝑛|𝑓𝑛=0, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑑                  𝜆𝑛 = 1  
𝑈0
∗ = 𝑈𝑛
∗(𝑠𝑛|𝑝𝑛=0, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 + 𝑈𝑛
∗ (𝑠𝑛|
𝑓𝑛=(
𝛼𝑡,𝑛
2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛
)
1
3
, 𝑠−𝑛)
𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙
   𝜆𝑛 = 0 
    (23) 
where 𝑈𝑛
∗(𝑠𝑛|𝑝𝑛=?̅?𝑛 , 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠  and 𝑈𝑛
∗(𝑠𝑛|𝑝𝑛=0, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠  are the 
best response of 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠, which can be gotten when 
𝑝𝑛 = ?̅?𝑛  and 𝑝𝑛 = 0  in (22) ，  respectively; 
𝑈𝑛
∗(𝑠𝑛|𝑓𝑛=0, 𝑠−𝑛)𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑑 = 𝛼𝑡,𝑛 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑛 𝑓𝑐
⁄  is the best response of the 
computation overhead in MEC server; 
𝑈𝑛
∗ (𝑠𝑛|
𝑓𝑛=(
𝛼𝑡,𝑛
2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛
)
1 3⁄ , 𝑠−𝑛)
𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙
 is the best response of the 
computation overhead in mobile user n.  
For the best response strategy, if 𝑈1
∗ < 𝑈0
∗ , then 𝜆𝑛 = 1; 
otherwise, if 𝑈1
∗ > 𝑈0
∗ , then 𝜆𝑛 = 0 . From (23), we can 
conclude that the values of 𝑈1
∗  and 𝑈0
∗  relate to the best 
response of 𝜆𝑛 , 𝑝𝑛 , 𝑓𝑛 , and the interference from the 
interference users (the users in 𝐼𝑛
𝑘 and 𝐼𝑖
𝑘); moreover, the value 
of (𝛼𝑡,𝑛 2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛⁄ )
1/3
 is constant and the best response of  𝑝𝑛 is 
determined by the interference from the users in 𝐼𝑛
𝑘. So we can 
conclude that 𝑈1
∗  and 𝑈0
∗  will be decided by the interference 
from the interference users. This means that the best response 
of 𝜆𝑛 is also decided by the interference from the interference 
users. Thus, Corollary 4 holds.             ■ 
Remark 3: The Corollary 4 is easy to be understood since for 
the mobile user n, if the interference from the interference users 
is high, then calculating the task locally is beneficial; otherwise, 
offloading the task to the MEC server is the best choice. The 
Corollary 4 does not mean that 𝜆𝑛  and 𝑝𝑛  are independent, 
since both 𝜆𝑛 and 𝑝𝑛  are affected by the interference caused by 
the data transmission of the interference users. The Corollary 4 
indicates that minimizing the interference (e.g., by transmission 
power control or offloading decision) is one possible approach 
to improve the performance of MEC. 
C. Process of the proposed algorithm  
Since we have proved the existence of the NE, so the main 
idea of this algorithm is to let the mobile users improve their 
strategies at each time slot and reach the NE at the end based 
on the best-response dynamic. 
At the beginning of each time slot, the BS allocates channels 
to the mobile users and measures the channel interference 
[5][18][19][20]; the measured channel interference will be sent 
to user n. Then, user n calculates the best responses of 𝜆𝑛, 𝑝𝑛, 
and 𝑓𝑛, and updates its strategy based on these best responses. 
First, the user n calculates the values of  ?̅?𝑛  and 
(𝛼𝑡,𝑛 2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛⁄ )
1/3
 according to the Corollary 2 and Corollary 3; 
when these two values are gotten, the best response of 𝑈1
∗ and 
𝑈0
∗  can be calculated. The offloading decision 𝜆𝑛  is decided 
based on the rules as follows: If 𝑈1
∗ < 𝑈0
∗ , then 𝜆𝑛 = 1 ; 
otherwise, if 𝑈1
∗ > 𝑈0
∗, 𝜆𝑛 = 0. Once the offloading decision is 
determined, the best response of the transmission power 𝑝𝑛 and 
the CPU capability 𝑓𝑛 can be decided based on: If 𝜆𝑛 = 0, then 
𝑝𝑛 = 0 and 𝑓𝑛 = (𝛼𝑡,𝑛 2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛⁄ )
1/3
; otherwise, if 𝜆𝑛 = 1, then 
𝑝𝑛 = ?̅?𝑛 and 𝑓𝑛 = 0. This process will be executed repeatedly 
until the NE is reached.   
Algorithm 1: Joint offloading decision and resources allocation  
1. initialization: 
2. each mobile user n chooses the offloading decision, the 
transmission power, and CPU capability as: 𝜆𝑛 = 1 , 𝑝𝑛 =
𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥, and 𝑓𝑛 = 0; 
3. end 
4. repeat for each user and each decision slot in parallel: 
5. send the pilot signal on the chosen communication channel to 
the base station; 
6. receive the channel interference from BS; 
7. calculate the best response of the transmission power ?̅?𝑛 and 
the CPU capability (𝛼𝑡,𝑛 2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛⁄ )
1/3
; 
8. calculate the 𝑈1
∗ and 𝑈0
∗ based on ?̅?𝑛 and (𝛼𝑡,𝑛 2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛⁄ )
1/3
; 
9. if  𝑈1
∗ > 𝑈0
∗ 
10.       𝜆𝑛 = 0; 
11. else if  𝑈1
∗ < 𝑈0
∗ 
12.      𝜆𝑛 = 1; 
13. end if 
14. if 𝜆𝑛 = 0 
15.      𝑝𝑛 = 0 and 𝑓𝑛 = (𝛼𝑡,𝑛 2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛⁄ )
1/3
; 
16. else if 𝜆𝑛 = 1 
  
 
 
17.      𝑝𝑛 = ?̅?𝑛 and 𝑓𝑛 = 0; 
18. end if 
19. repeat until NE is meet. 
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
A. Convergence and Computational Complexity 
In [31] and [32], the authors have proved that for any 
potential game, the best response dynamics always converge to 
a pure Nash Equilibrium. Since the game 𝐺′  is an exact 
potential game, so the algorithm proposed in this paper is 
convergent. 
Corollary 5. Finding the NE of game 𝐺′ by the best response 
approach is PLS-complete and the computational complexity is 
𝑂[𝐶𝑛 log3(𝑛)]. 
Proof. In [31] and [32], the authors have proved that for the 
potential game which applies the best response approach in the 
process of reaching NE, if the best response can be computed 
in polynomial time, then this problem is PLS (Polynomial Local 
Search) complete. In game 𝐺′, there are three best responses 
that need to be calculated in each time slot, which are 𝜆𝑛, 𝑝𝑛, 
and 𝑓𝑛. The computational complexity for calculating the best 
response of 𝑓𝑛 is 𝑂(1), since the best response of 𝑓𝑛 is constant. 
For calculating the best response of 𝑝𝑛, the Newton Method is 
applied. In [35], the authors have proved that for 𝑓(𝑥), the 
computation complexity of the Newton Method is 
𝑂[log(𝑛)𝐹(𝑛)] , where 𝐹(𝑛)  is the computation cost of 
𝑓(𝑥) 𝑓′(𝑥)⁄ . Moreover, in game 𝐺′ , 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛). Since 
𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)  and 𝑈𝑛
′ (𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)  are all polynomial, so the 
𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) 𝑈𝑛
′ (𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)⁄  is also polynomial. This means that the 
computation of 𝐹(𝑛)  can be completed in polynomial time. 
Thus, the calculation of the best response of  𝑝𝑛 can be finished 
in polynomial time. Based on the Corollary 4, the best response 
of 𝜆𝑛  relates to the calculation of  ?̅?𝑛  and (𝛼𝑡,𝑛 2𝛼𝑒,𝑛𝜅𝑛⁄ )
1/3
; 
therefore, the computation of 𝜆𝑛  also can be completed at 
polynomial time.  
For game 𝐺′ , at each time slot, the computational 
complexity relates to the best response calculation of 𝜆𝑛, 𝑝𝑛, 
and 𝑓𝑛. As shown in the Corollary 5, the complexity of the best 
response computation of 𝑓𝑛  is 𝑂(1), which is much simpler 
than that of 𝑝𝑛 and 𝜆𝑛 , and can be ignored. Moreover, when 
the best response of  𝑝𝑛 and 𝑓𝑛 are gotten, the complexity of the 
best response calculation of 𝜆𝑛 is also simple, which is shown 
in (23). Therefore, the main computational complexity of this 
algorithm is caused by the calculation of the best response of 
𝑝𝑛, i.e., the Newton Method. So the computational complexity 
of game 𝐺′ is 𝑂[log(𝑛)𝐹(𝑛)] in one-time slot, where 𝐹(𝑛) is the 
computational cost of 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) 𝑈𝑛
′ (𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛)⁄ . According to 
(18), the computational cost of 𝐹(𝑛) is 𝑂[𝑛 log2(𝑛)]. Therefore, 
the computational complexity of this algorithm in one-time slot 
is 𝑂[𝑛 log3(𝑛)]. Assuming that the algorithm needs C rounds 
iteration for reaching NE, then the computation complexity of 
the proposed algorithm is [5]: 𝑂[𝐶𝑛 log3(𝑛)]. This demonstrates 
that the algorithm can be completed at polynomial time. Thus, 
the Corollary 5 holds.    ■ 
B. Properties of the game 
In this section, we learn the PoA of the computation 
overhead of the whole network, i.e., ∑ 𝑈𝑛𝑛∈𝑵,𝑠𝑛∈𝒔 . Based on the 
conclusion in [36], the PoA is defined as: 
 𝑃𝑜𝐴 =
∑ 𝑈𝑛𝑛∈𝑵,𝑠𝑛∈𝒔 (?̃?)
∑ 𝑈𝑛𝑛∈𝑵,𝑠𝑛∈𝒔 (𝒔
∗)
    (24)  
where ?̃? is the NE of game 𝐺′ , 𝒔∗  is the centralized optimal 
solution for all the mobile users, 𝑈𝑛 is the overhead of user n by 
the game theory based algorithm; ?̅?𝑛  is the overhead by the 
centralized algorithm. The PoA represents the efficiency ratio 
of the worst-case of NE over the centralized optimal solutions. 
For the MEC, the smaller the PoA is, the better the performance 
is [5].  
Corollary 6. For game 𝐺′, the PoA of the network computation 
overhead satisfies that: 
1 ≤ 𝑃𝑜𝐴 ≤
∑ (𝑈𝑛,𝑐
𝑚𝑎𝑥+∑ 𝑈𝑖𝑖∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘 )+∑ (𝑈𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥+∑ 𝑈𝑖𝑖∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘 )
𝑁
𝑛=1,𝜆𝑛=0
𝑁
𝑛=1,𝜆𝑛=1
∑ (𝑈𝑛,𝑐
𝑚𝑖𝑛+∑ 𝑈𝑖𝑖∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘 )+∑ (𝑈𝑛
𝑚𝑖𝑛+∑ 𝑈𝑖𝑖∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘 )
𝑁
𝑛=1,𝜆𝑛=0
𝑁
𝑛=1,𝜆𝑛=1
     (25) 
where 𝑈𝑛,𝑐
𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
(𝛼𝑡+𝛼𝑒𝑝𝑛)𝑠𝑛
𝑤𝑘 log2(1+
𝑝𝑛𝐺𝑛
𝑁0+∑ 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥
′ 𝐺𝑗𝑗∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝜆𝑗=1
)
+ 𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑛,𝑐 +
𝛼𝑒𝑒𝑛,𝑐 , 𝑈𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
𝛼𝑡𝑐𝑛
𝑓𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝛼𝑒𝜅𝑛𝑐𝑛(𝑓𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥)2 , ?̅?𝑛,𝑐
𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
(𝛼𝑡+𝛼𝑒𝑝𝑛)𝑠𝑛
𝑤𝑘 log2(1+
𝑝𝑛𝐺𝑛
𝑁0
)
+
𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑛,𝑐 + 𝛼𝑒𝑒𝑛,𝑐 , ?̅?𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
𝛼𝑡𝑐𝑛
𝑓𝑛
∗ + 𝛼𝑒𝜅𝑛𝑐𝑛(𝑓𝑛
∗)2 , and 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥
′ ≜
max {𝑝𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐼𝑛
𝑘 }. 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥
′  is the maximum transmission power of 
all mobile users in 𝐼𝑛
𝑘. 
Proof. Assuming that ?̃?  is the NE of game 𝐺′  and 𝒔∗  is the 
centralized optimal solution for all the mobile users. According 
to the conclusion in [5] and [31], since the performance of the 
centralized optimal algorithm is better than that of game theory 
based algorithm, so 𝑃𝑜𝐴 ≥ 1. 
For the game theory based algorithm, when 𝜆𝑛 = 1, the 
transmission rate of user n satisfies that: 
𝑟𝑛(?̃?) = 𝑤𝑘 log2 (1 +
𝑝𝑛𝐺𝑛
𝑁0+∑ 𝑝𝑗𝐺𝑗𝑗∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝜆𝑗=1
)  
≥ 𝑤𝑘 log2 (1 +
𝑝𝑛𝐺𝑛
𝑁0+∑ 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥
′ 𝐺𝑗𝑗∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝜆𝑗=1
)     (26) 
where 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥
′ ≜ max {𝑝𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐼𝑛
𝑘 } . Based on (8) and (26), the 
overhead of user n satisfies that: 
𝑈𝑛,𝑐 =
(𝛼𝑡+𝛼𝑒𝑝𝑛)𝑠𝑛
𝑤𝑘 log2(1+
𝑝𝑛𝐺𝑛
𝑁0+∑ 𝑝𝑗𝐺𝑗𝑗∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝜆𝑗=1
)
+ 𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑛,𝑐 + 𝛼𝑒𝑒𝑛,𝑐  
≤
(𝛼𝑡+𝛼𝑒𝑝𝑛)𝑠𝑛
𝑤𝑘 log2(1+
𝑝𝑛𝐺𝑛
𝑁0+∑ 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥
′ 𝐺𝑗𝑗∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝜆𝑗=1
)
+  𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑛,𝑐 +  𝛼𝑒𝑒𝑛,𝑐 = 𝑈𝑛,𝑐
𝑚𝑎𝑥   
(27) 
When 𝜆𝑛 = 0, the overhead of user n can be calculated as: 
𝑈𝑛 =
𝛼𝑡𝑐𝑛
𝑓𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝛼𝑒𝜅𝑛𝑐𝑛(𝑓𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥)2 ≤
𝛼𝑡𝑐𝑛
𝑓𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝛼𝑒𝜅𝑛𝑐𝑛(𝑓𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥)2 = 𝑈𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥   
 (28) 
For the centralized optimal algorithm, when 𝜆𝑛 = 1, the 
transmission rate satisfies that: 
  
 
 
𝑟𝑛(𝒔
∗) = 𝑤𝑘 log2 (1 +
𝑝𝑛𝐺𝑛
𝑁0+∑ 𝑝𝑗𝐺𝑗𝑗∈𝐼𝑛
𝑘,𝜆𝑗=1
) ≤ 𝑤𝑘 log2 (1 +
𝑝𝑛𝐺𝑛
𝑁0
)  
 (29) 
Therefore, when 𝜆𝑛 = 1, we have: 
𝑈𝑛,𝑐 =
(𝛼𝑡+𝛼𝑒𝑝𝑛)𝑠𝑛
𝑤𝑘 log2(1+
𝑝𝑛𝐺𝑛
𝑁0+∑ 𝑝𝑗𝐺𝑗𝑗∈𝑁\{𝑛},𝜆𝑗=1
)
+ 𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑛,𝑐 + 𝛼𝑒𝑒𝑛,𝑐  
≥
(𝛼𝑡+𝛼𝑒𝑝𝑛)𝑠𝑛
𝑤𝑘 log2(1+
𝑝𝑛𝐺𝑛
𝑁0
)
+ 𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑛,𝑐 + 𝛼𝑒𝑒𝑛,𝑐 = ?̅?𝑛,𝑐
𝑚𝑖𝑛   (30) 
Similar to the game theory based algorithm, when 𝜆𝑛 = 0, 
the computation overhead is:  
𝑈𝑛 =
𝛼𝑡𝑐𝑛
𝑓𝑛
+ 𝛼𝑒𝜅𝑛𝑐𝑛𝑓𝑛
2 ≥
𝛼𝑡𝑐𝑛
𝑓𝑛
𝑚𝑖𝑛 + 𝛼𝑒𝜅𝑛𝑐𝑛(𝑓𝑛
𝑚𝑖𝑛)
2
= ?̅?𝑛
𝑚𝑖𝑛       (31) 
Thus, according to (27), (28), (30), and (31), the Corollary 
6 holds. ■ 
Note that the PoA reflects the worst cause of the game 
theory based algorithm over the centralized optimal algorithm; 
therefore, based on the Corollary 6, we can conclude that the 
PoA will decrease as the interference from the interference 
users reduces. This demonstrates that controlling network 
interference is effective in improving the performances of MEC, 
which is consistent with the conclusion in the Corollary 4. 
Corollary 7. The NE of game 𝐺′ is Pareto Efficiency. 
Proof. Based on [37], the Pareto efficiency is defined as: if 𝒙 =
{𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑁} , where 𝑥𝑖 ∈ ℝ  and 𝑖 ∈ 𝑵 , is Pareto optimal 
solution and 𝑈𝑖 is the utility of i, then there is no other feasible 
solution 𝒙′ = {𝑥1
′ , 𝑥2
′ , … , 𝑥𝑁
′ } , such that 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖
′) ≥ 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖) for all the 
users with 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖
′) > 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖) for some users.  
In game 𝐺′, assuming that 𝒔 = {𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑁} is a NE; so for 
∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑵 , there is no solution 𝒔′ = {𝑠1
′ , 𝑠2
′ , … , 𝑠𝑁
′ }  , which can 
make the 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) ≥ 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛
′ , 𝑠−𝑛) true; moreover, the solution 
𝒔′ = {𝑠1
′ , 𝑠2
′ , … , 𝑠𝑁
′ }  also cannot make the 𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛, 𝑠−𝑛) >
𝑈𝑛(𝑠𝑛
′ , 𝑠−𝑛) true for all the users. So, on the one hand, the NE of 
game 𝐺′ is the optimal solution to the optimal function shown 
in (11), which means that 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖
′) > 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖) for some users holds; 
on the other hand, no users can reduce their computation 
overhead without increasing other users overhead, which 
means that 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖
′) ≥ 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖) for all the users hold. And thereby, 
the NE of game 𝐺′ is Pareto efficiency.       ■ 
VI. NUMERICAL RESULT  
In this section, we will show the performances of the 
proposed algorithm by simulation. In this simulation, the 
mobile users are randomly deployed at the coverage area of BS 
with the numbers vary from 8 to 20. The bandwidth of the 
wireless channel is 20MHz and the number of sub-channels is 
10. The transmission power of user changes from 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 to 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥; 
the 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 can be calculated according to the SINR threshold and 
the measured interference in Section 4; the 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥  is set to 
150mW. The noise is -100dBm [26]. The channel gain 𝐺𝑛 =
𝑑𝑛,𝑙
−𝛾
 [26], where 𝑑𝑛,𝑙 is the distance between the mobile user n 
and BS l; 𝛾 is the path loss factor which is set to 4. Similar to 
[5], in this simulation, 𝐿𝑛 = 5000Kb  and 𝐶𝑛 =
1000Megacycles . The CPU computation capability 𝑓𝑐  is 
10GHz. The decision weights 𝛼𝑡 , 𝛼𝑒 ∈ [0,1] and 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑒 = 1, 
so we set 𝛼𝑡 ∈ {1,0.5,0} [5]. For each mobile user, 𝜅𝑛 = 10
−27 
and 𝑓𝑛,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1GHz [13].  
A. Convergence of the game 
Our results show that for our proposed game theory based 
algorithm, the offloading decision, the transmission power, the 
CPU capability, and the overhead of each user can coverage to 
the NE point. The Fig.1(a) shows the convergence of the 
offloading decisions. The same as that proved in the Corollary 
1, the value of  λ converges to 0 or 1 with the increasing of the 
iteration times. As shown in the Fig.1(b), the value of CPU 
capability is also binary, i.e. 𝑓 = 0 or 𝑓 = 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥. Moreover, the 
values of the CPU capability and the offloading decision are 
contrary, which can be found in the Fig.1(a) and Fig.1(b). This 
is consistent with the theoretical analysis in Section 4. The 
transmission power of mobile user is shown in the Fig.1(c), 
which is convergent and smaller than 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥. Different from the 
CPU capability, when the offloading decision is 1, the 
transmission power is larger than 0; otherwise, the transmission 
power equals to 0. The Fig.1(d) demonstrates that the 
computation overhead of each mobile user is convergent, too. 
  
(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
Fig.1 Convergence of the game: (a) offloading decision; (b) CPU capability; (c) 
transmission power; (d) computation overhead 
B. Effect of interference  
Our result shows that reducing the interference can improve 
the performances of the proposed algorithm effectively, which 
is consistent with the conclusion of the Corollary 6. Fig.2 
demonstrates the variation of PoA when increases the 
interference. In this simulation, we use 1/𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑅 to represent the 
effect of the interference, where 𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑅 = ∑ 𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑅𝑛𝑛∈𝑵  and 𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑅𝑛 
is the SINR of user n. So the larger 1/𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑅 , the larger 
interference. With the increase of the interference, the PoA 
increases. When the value of 1/SINR is fixed, such as 0.7, the 
PoA reduces with the increase of the network density. This is 
because when the value of 1/𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑅 is fixed, the more users in 
the network, the smaller interference of each user, which also 
means small PoA.  
C. Effect of the number of users 
Our result shows that the number of users has a great effect 
on the performances of the algorithm: first, the more users in 
the network, the more users to offload the task to the MEC 
server; second, the more users in the network, the higher 
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network computation overhead is; third, the more users, the 
longer time to reach the NE point. The Fig.3 illustrates the 
number of users who offload their computation task to the MEC 
server under different network densities. Since the algorithm is 
convergent, the number of users that offload the task to MEC 
server becomes constant. Before reaching the NE point, with 
the increasing of the iteration time, the resources in mobile 
users are consumed and more and more mobile users choose to 
offload the computation task to the MEC server. This is because 
the MEC server has better computation capability and resources 
than mobile users. The number of users which offload tasks to 
the MEC server increases when the network density grows. 
However, this increase becomes slowly when the network 
density is large, since the interference is serious in this scenario.  
  
Fig.2. The PoA under different 
network conditions 
Fig.3. The number of beneficial users 
under different network conditions 
  
Fig.4. The network overhead under 
different network conditions 
Fig.5. The convergence rate under 
different network density 
In the Fig.4, the network overheads under different network 
densities are presented. Different from the results shown in the 
Fig.3, in the Fig.4, with the increase of the iteration time, the 
network overhead decreases before reaching the NE point. 
When the network reaches NE, the network overhead keeps 
stable. This result demonstrates that the proposed algorithm is 
effective in reducing network computation overhead. For 
different network densities, the more users in the network are, 
the higher computation overhead is. This is because the more 
users, the more serious interference, which leads to high 
network computation overhead. However, due to the game 
between different users, the increase of the computation 
overhead with the increase of the network density becomes 
slowly. This means that the proposed algorithm is effective in 
improving the performances of MEC. The number of iteration 
times for reaching NE under different network densities is 
shown in the Fig.5. Due to the interference, the more users are, 
the more iteration times are needed to reach the NE point. The 
increase is near a linear, which means that the algorithm can 
converge in a fast manner. 
D. Effect of task size 
Our result shows that the size of the task also has a great 
effect on the performances of the algorithm; the larger task size 
is, the more users choose to offload the task to the MEC server 
and the higher network computation overhead is. As shown in 
the Fig. 3, if the length of input data increases, the number of 
users that offload the tasks to the MEC server under the same 
network density increases, too. This is because when the task 
size increases, the computation overhead of the local execution 
increases, which can be found in (23); therefore, more users will 
offload their computation task to the MEC server for saving 
energy and reducing latency. The Fig.4 also demonstrates that 
when the computation load increases, the network overhead 
increases, too. The reason is similar to that shown in the Fig.3. 
VII. CONCLUSION  
In this paper, we make the following key contributions. First, 
we proposed a game theory based joint offloading decision and 
resources allocation algorithm for multi-user MEC. Second, we 
prove that this game is an exact potential game and the NE of 
this game exists and is unique. Third, the convergence and the 
computational complexity of this algorithm are investigated. 
Fourth, we investigate the PoA of this algorithm and conclude 
that the interference from the interference users has the main 
effect on the performances of MEC, which is consistent with 
the conclusion in the Corollary 4. Fifth, we prove that the NE 
of this game is Pareto efficiency and also the global optimal 
solution shown in (10). The simulation results also show the 
effectiveness of this algorithm on improving the performances 
of MEC.  
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